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SHADOW JUSTICE: THE IDEOLOGY AND INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF 
ALTERNATIVES TO COURT. By Christine B. Harrington. Westport, 
Conn.: Greenwood Press. 1985. Pp. x, 216. $29.95. 
In 1973, Professor Richard Danzig proposed the adoption in this 
country of the community moot, a forum for dispute resolution 
adapted from the Kpelle tribal moot of Liberia.1 Danzig's indictment 
of the judicial system reflected widespread sentiments: 
The present system does not, after all, perform the job of adjudication in 
most of these [minor civil and criminal] cases. Civil proceedings are gen-
erally avoided because the parties are too ignorant, fearful, or impover-
ished to turn to small claims courts, legal aid, or similar institutions. 
Many matters which may technically be criminal violations will not be 
prosecuted because they are viewed by the prosecuting authorities as pri-
vate and trivial matters .... [W]e know that due to institutional over-
crowding and established patterns of sentencing the vast majority of 
misdemeanants and some felons are not likely to be imprisoned. For 
these defendants, the judicial process is not a screen filtering those who 
are innocent from those who will be directed to the corrective parts of 
1. Danzig, Toward the Creation of a Complementary, Decentralized System of Criminal Jus-
tice, 26 STAN. L. REV. 1, 47-48 (1973). 
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the process. Rather, it is the corrective process; as such it fails to be 
more than a "Bleak House," profoundly alienating, rather than 
integrating. 2 
In the less than fifteen years following Danzig's recommendation, 
some two hundred Neighborhood Justice Centers3 have been estab-
lished to more effectively resolve family, neighborhood, and other dis-
putes between people who know each other. Part of the broad 
alternative dispute resolution "movement," Neighborhood Justice 
Centers adopt informal mechanisms, primarily mediation and arbitra-
tion, to involve the parties in reaching a maximum solution at a mini-
mum cost of time, money, and emotional damage. 
Christine Harrington4 views the Neighborhood Justice Center as 
an example of judicial reform which has its roots in turn-of-the-cen-
tury movements to abolish the rural justice of the peace courts in favor 
of specialized municipal courts such as small claims and family court. 
Her book, Shadow Justice: The Ideology and Institutionalization of Al-
ternatives to Court, is part political history, part sociological analysis, 
part review of the literature of Alternative Dispute Resolution 
("ADR"), and part case study. Alternating between thick theoretical 
jargon and succinct historical prose, the book reads more like a collec-
tion ofloosely connected essays than a unified work. Nevertheless, the 
material is interesting in several respects to those concerned with the 
policy and implementation of ADR. 
Shadow Justice can be divided into two parts. In one part (primar-
ily Chapter One, "Courts and the Ideology of Informalism") the au-
thor develops a structural critique of "informalism," dispute 
resolution outside the formal court system. This critique is based on a 
sociological analysis of the forces and effects of judicial reform. The 
other part comprises the author's review of historical precedents and 
the politics of ADR. To reverse the book's order of presentation, 
which may unfortunately discourage the fainthearted reader from ever 
reaching the book's more accessible portions, this Notice will discuss 
the historical aspect first. 
The book contains the author's original research in two areas: a 
history of judicial reform in the "Progressive period,"5 and a case 
study of the operations of the Kansas City Neighborhood Justice 
Center. The author also reviews federal efforts to expand availability 
of ADR which.culminated in the Dispute Resolution Act of 1980.6 
2. Id. at 44 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Shrag, Bleak House 1968: A Report on Consumer 
Test Litigation, 44 N.Y.U. L. REV. 115 (1969)). 
3. Sees. GOLDBERG, E. GREEN & F. SANDER, DISPUTE RESOLUTION 347 (1985). 
4. Assistant Professor in the Department of Politics at New York University. 
5. The author never defines the Progressive period (perhaps indicating an assumption about 
her audience's familiarity with political history) but discusses judicial reform efforts from circa 
18 80 to the late 1920s. 
6. 28 U.S.C. app. §§ 1-10 (1982) (appropriations for the Act expired in 1985). 
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The findings in these areas demonstrate the needs, goals, and political 
tensions surrounding the ADR movement. 
For the student of ADR, the discussion of the judicial reform 
movement of the early 1900s and the politics surrounding the Dispute 
Resolution Act is informative. Harrington points out that earlier re-
forms sought to decrease the considerable discretion wielded by the 
justice of the peace courts in order to stem arbitrary disposition of 
disputes and to assure justice through emphasis on procedural due 
process. In contrast, ADR often moves in the opposite direction. 
Mediators, especially those with authority to arbitrate a disposition if 
disputants cannot resolve their differences through a pure mediation 
process, exercise considerable discretion. The prosecutors, police, and 
judicial officials who refer the bulk of cases to Neighborhood Justice 
Centers likewise exercise considerable discretion, often under vague 
guidelines (e.g., "where mediation is likely to accomplish a more satis-
factory result"). While litigation involves substantial discretion as 
well, procedural due process absent in ADR protects the litigant. 
In Chapter Three, "The Politics of Legal Resources," Harrington 
demonstrates that judicial reform, while seeking to advance neutral 
principles of justice, is often a weapon in the battle between opposing 
interest groups. For example, in the lobbying leading up to the Dis-
pute Resolution Act, consumer groups struggled to broaden access to 
the courts by such means as publicly funded consumer legal represen-
tation and a consumer affairs agency. Business groups, however, 
fought to channel consumer disputes to ADR mechanisms instead. 
This shows an overriding concern about ADR: that reforms which 
seek to increase access to dispute resolution mechanisms may in prac-
tice inhibit access to the broad remedial power of the courts desired by 
certain underrepresented groups. The author reminds us of the devel-
opment of small claims courts as mechanisms to increase public access 
to the courts, but which now serve primarily as collection agencies for 
businesses large and small. 
This concern is reinforced by the author's finding in Chapter Four, 
"Institutionalizing Voluntarism," that the Kansas City Neighborhood 
Justice Center successfully processed few disputes involving an indi-
vidual and an organization. Because of their greater resources (i.e., 
lawyers), organizations were not subject to the same coerced participa-
tion as were individual complainants without the means to litigate. 
Individual respondents more often succumbed to empty threats that 
they would be prosecuted if they chose not to mediate. The author 
supplies detailed statistics to back up these findings. However, what is 
most impressive about her portrayal of the Kansas City program is not 
its empirical findings. It is rather the concrete sense that the Neigh-
borhood Justice Center operated more to serve the convenience of 
public officials than the needs of aggrieved parties. 
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As for the author's sociological interpretation of contemporary ju-
dicial reform, one not schooled in sociopolitical methodology will find 
it difficult to pinpoint the principle themes running through the cur-
rents of "-isms" and "-zations" which traverse the book. Besides the 
jargon, the theoretical critique is diluted by an obvious shortcoming: 
the author fails to tell us a better way. 
The first chapter, "Courts and the Ideology of Informalism," pro-
vides perhaps the best example of the frustration the reader uninitiated 
to sociological and political vocabulary faces on his or her way 
upstream: 
A sociological perspective on legal ideology informs this study of the 
relationship between the ideology and institutions of inf ormalism .... In 
the process of identifying the underlying social relations constituting 
legal ideology, the instrumental tendency to reduce the ideology of in-
formalism to a mere social control function (e.g., rationalization, legiti-
mation) must be avoided. Those who have worked on the concept of 
legal ideology more directly point out that "we should abandon any a 
priori views about [law's] integrative or legitimating functions and treat 
them as open questions relating to understanding the specific effects or 
consequences of legal regulation and legal ideology."7 
Harrington's basic thesis is quite general: the reform goal of "in-
formalism" is problematic. Primary among the author's arguments is 
the theory that the politics and pragmatic requirements of setting up 
an out-of-court dispute resolution process contradict the goals of 
ADR. The author echoes a recurrent concern: rather than furthering 
the goals of social justice, the structure of such informal processes 
serves to legitimize the expansion of state control over dispute 
resolution. s 
In the author's view, since ADR mechanisms such as Neighbor-
hood Justice Centers rely heavily on referrals from judges, clerks, 
prosecutors, and the police for their caseloads, and on tentative fund-
ing resources, they allow too much discretion on the part of officials 
and compromise the legitimate needs of disputants. Referral is often 
by coercion of the parties, and is motivated at least in part by the 
desire of the officials to "dump" the minor civil and criminal cases 
involved. 
This critique calls into question the legitimacy and desirability of 
ADR. Yet it ignores an important question: what alternative? The 
author does not dispute the failure, due to high cost, delay, ignorance, 
and overly combative process, of the formal court system to address 
mundane but important conflicts. And the discussion of the impor-
7. Pp. 13-14 (quoting Hunt, The Ideology of Law: Advances and Problems in Recent Applica-
tions of the Concept of Ideology to the Analysis of Law, 19 LAW & SocY. REV. 11, 17-18 (1985)). 
8. See, e.g., Shonholtz, Neighborhood Justice Systems: Work, Structure, and Guiding Princl· 
ples, 5 MEDIATION Q. 3, 10-11, 13-16 (1984), reprinted in s. GOLDBERG, E. GREEN & F. 
SANDER, supra note 3, at 364-67. 
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tance of due process implicitly recognizes that at least to some extent 
these costs are a consequence of the strong value our system places on 
due process in the resolution of major disputes. Harrington does criti-
cize the process of selecting which cases are directed away from court 
and into ADR. But she does so to draw attention to the exercise of 
official discretion; she does not challenge separating disputes by degree 
of severity per se. 
In this context, the exposition of structural relationships between 
informalism and official discretion seems beside the point. If these dis-
putes are festering for want of access to the courts, and if the quality of 
life in the community suffers significantly as a result, then pointing out 
that ADR in some instances expands the scope of state "control" 
seems a hollow observation. Harrington's analysis does little to guide 
the judicial reformer. Instead, its message seems to be: "don't 
bother." 
In sum, Shadow Justice is largely a treatise in the political theory 
of judicial reform, with a heavy dose of sociological methodology and 
vocabulary. The highly specialized orientation of the theoretical anal-
ysis is of limited interest in the field beyond perhaps the handful of 
scholars and judicial reformers working on alternatives to litigation. 
Though at times impenetrable to one not conversant in "Weberism," 
the book is of value to those seeking to broaden their understanding of 
the politics of ADR.9 The work is most enlightening in its exploration 
of the political tensions surrounding judicial reform, both historical 
and contemporary, and the empirical demonstration of the initial 
shortcomings of the Neighborhood Justice System in achieving the 
goals envisioned by Danzig and others. 
- Andrew J. McGuinness 
9. For an excellent introduction and overview of ADR, see S. GOLDBERG, E. GREEN & F. 
SANDER, supra note 3. 
